Based on my research, I argue instead that structural conditions allowed the ethno-political radicalism of Miskitu leaders to influence the Mayangna. After outlining the historical relationship between the two groups, I will show how a lack of political sophistication on the part of the Mayangna leadership, together with Sandinista ignorance, dogmatism and a tendency to violence, eventually resulted in the mobilisation of around half the Mayangna population against the Revolution. I further argue that Sandinista compromise was important in subsequently persuading the Mayangna to demobilise, which attests to the key role the Sandinistas played in provoking the conflict in the first place. This Sandinista compromise, paired with 4 Miskitu abuses during the war, led to a shift in Mayangna allegiance from the rebels to the government. This, I argue, has influenced the Mayangna interpretation of their entire history as a people, as they increasingly define themselves in opposition to the Miskitu -reinforcing the Mayangna narrative of Miskitu 'deception' as the key factor in their mobilisation against the Sandinistas.
Regional History
The Atlantic Coast had alternately been a British protectorate and an independent 'Miskitu Kingdom' from the early seventeenth century until its official incorporation into Nicaragua in 1860. The Miskitu emerged as an ethnic group distinct from neighbouring Indian tribes during the colonial era. While the peoples of the region had long raided as well as traded with one another (Carey, 2002) , in the early seventeenth century the coast-dwelling ancestors of the Miskitu acquired firearms from European buccaneers, tipping the local balance of power firmly in their direction. These proto-Miskitu, as intermediaries in the relations between Europeans and the other Indians living in the region, soon began to view themselves in opposition to their inland neighbours -the ancestors of the Mayangna (Helms, 1969) .
The Mayangna today live mainly in the isolated, mountainous country around the north-western mining centres of Bonanza, Rosita and Siuna, but Mayangna tribes had historically dominated central and eastern Nicaragua, as attested to by the multitude of Mayangna place names that survive across these areas (Dolores Green, . But while they were largely able to resist Spanish attempts to invade their territory from bases on the Pacific (Gould, 1998: 76) , the Mayangna increasingly succumbed to Miskitu raiders from the Atlantic and began a steady retreat into the more remote fastnesses of the interior that continued even after the British gave up the 5 Atlantic Coast in 1860. By then the Mayangna population had declined from a possible pre-contact total of over 30,000 (Newson, quoted in Green, 1989: 13) to around 5-6000 (Conzemius, 1929: 14) , as wars with the Spanish and Miskitu slaving expeditions gave way to increasing assimilationist pressures from both mestizo Nicaraguans and the Miskitu. This decline was exacerbated by conflicts between the different Mayangna tribes and a series of disastrous epidemics (Conzemius, 1932) . (Houwald, 2006: 517) , and after the departure of the British, Moravian missionaries managed to convert a large portion of the Miskitu population to the new faith in the 1880s (Hale, 1994: 40-41; Hawley, 1997: 114) .
Turning their attention to the Mayangna, the missionaries encouraged Mayangna resettlement in new, permanent villages built around churches, and often close to existing Miskitu communities, in place of their dispersed, seasonal settlements (Houwald, 2006: 523) . This, together with the Moravian policy of preaching of the Gospel and teaching literacy only in the Miskitu language, brought the Mayangna into greater contact with both Miskitu individuals and Miskitu culture in general. This increased the tendency of Mayangna individuals to try to shed their original identity either by marrying out of the group or by abandoning their original language in order to move up the Coastal ethnic hierarchy, in which the Miskitu had a higher position. By the mid-twentieth century many of the new communities founded by Mayangna converts had become wholly 'Miskitu' (Houwald and Jenkins Molieri, 1975) , while in several southern, 'Twahka' Mayangna communities, like Wasakín, the two groups now lived together side by side.
The complexity of this situation is belied by von Houwald, who portrays both the Miskitu and the Mayangna as coherent and historically opposed 'proto-nations'.
Many Mayangna adopt a similar view of their history as a people, in part to challenge the current power of the Miskitu within the Atlantic Coast's autonomous political system. However, Mayangna antipathy to the Miskitu is also connected to a colonialera rivalry which continued into the twentieth century, when the Mayangna felt unable to use their language in public in mining towns like Bonanza and Rosita, fearful of mockery by the local Miskitu inhabitants (interview with Juan McKenzie, 2011). A report from an American Marine commander, leading a local campaign against Sandino's rebel guerrillas in the 1930s, notes that the local Mayangna '...remained hidden until our Miskito boatmen left us. It appeared that their fear and hatred of these few Miskitos had kept them away fully as much as their distrust of us' (Edson, quoted in Brooks, 1989: 324) .
Explaining Mayangna Mobilisation
Somoza's regime had treated the Atlantic Coast as an internal colony, exploiting the region's resources but otherwise neglecting it (see Hale, 1994; Vilas, 1989) .
However, the Sandinista Revolution heralded sudden and dramatic change in the region. Proclaiming as one of their primary targets the 'integration' of the region and its peoples (FSLN, 1981, in Ohland and Schneider, 1983) , the Sandinistas dramatically increased the presence of the State in the region, despatching teachers, doctors, soldiers and new revolutionary officials who sought, after centuries of 7 neglect, to 'develop' the Coast in the image of the Nicaragua they wanted to build, based on the Nicaragua they already knew.
According to the testimonies of individuals from a wide range of different Mayangna communities, early Mayangna experiences of the Revolution were largely positive. The Revolution built new roads and clinics in the region (INNICA, 1981: 3) , and the Sandinista-led 'Literacy Crusade' benefitted the Mayangna population, which by this time ranged from perhaps six to eight thousand (Houwald, 2006) . Initially the Sandinista administrators envisioned a single, nation-wide literacy campaign in Spanish, while Miskitu leaders demanded that literacy in the region should be taught only in Miskitu (Jenkins Molieri, 1986: 254) . Eventually, however, SUKAWALA (Sumu Kalpapakna Wahaini Lani, or 'Fraternal Union of Sumu Communities'), the Mayangna ethnic organisation, was permitted to take charge of a literacy campaign in the Mayangna language, and enthusiastic young activists were despatched across the region in what was, many former participants recall with pride, not only the first time that many Mayangna learned to read and write -1,449 according to a government report (INNICA, 1981: 3) -but also the birth of Mayangna itself as a written language (Norwood, 1987 Unlike the Miskitu, the Mayangna had no political connections with the Somoza regime or cultural bonds with its American backers that can help to explain their mobilisation against the Sandinistas (Dennis, 1981; Hale, 1994) . Why then, given the troubled history of their relations with the Miskitu and positive initial experiences of the Revolution, did so many Mayangna communities ally with the former against the latter? Enrique López, a Mayangna leader closely associated with the MISURA guerrillas during the 1980s, states that: 'We knew that we had a way out through education, but we also had directions from the Miskitu leadership… they told us that we had to divide Nicaragua, that the Coast needed real independence. We were not sure about what that meant… they deceived us' (interview with Enrique López, 2011) .
While this explanation conveniently excuses Mayangna leaders -like López himself -from any blame for the hardships the Mayangna subsequently faced in the Civil War, it also makes explicit the idea that radical Miskitu nationalists did exercise a powerful influence over many Mayangna. In the following section, I will show how Miskitu dominance of the Moravian Church -to which almost the entire Mayangna population adhered by 1979 -was key to the spread of this influence. This was exacerbated by the political naivety and greed of some Mayangna leaders, and by the Sandinistas, who failed to understand the nature of this ethnically defined domination (McSweeney, 2004; Hale, 1994: 192) , and thus reacted violently to what they saw as Mayangna 'treason', ultimately leading many Mayangna to mobilise against them. (Hale, 1994: 133) . This decision illustrates the Sandinistas' economistic tendency to view 'class' as more important than 'ethnicity' (Wheelock, 1980) , and the fact that, as mestizos drawn almost exclusively from the Pacific and Central regions of Nicaragua, their nationalist ideology was fundamentally 'mestizo' in its conception (Hooker, 2005) . 'Indian' identity in Nicaragua had long been defined in opposition to their own, 'mestizo' identity, as part of a discourse, propagated at a national level from the time of independence onwards, that aimed to justify the construction of a 'Nicaraguan' nation-state by creating a united 'Nicaraguan' -and thus mestizo -population (Gould, 1988) . 'Indigeneity' was therefore defined negatively as a monolithic 'other-ness,' which obscured mestizo recognition of the complexity inherent to indigenous identity, of the troubled relationships between the different Indian groups on the Coast, and of the distinct problems and needs of each. MISURASATA leaders meanwhile avoided challenging these assumptions of Indian homogeneity, presenting themselves publicly as 'Indians' rather than 'Miskitu'. By claiming to represent all of the Indian peoples of the Coast, Miskitu leaders added additional legitimacy to their demands, which nevertheless overwhelmingly reflected the history, culture and aspirations of their people alone.
Although MISURASATA did not begin to openly confront the Sandinistas until early 1981, the message its activists and leaders had always expounded in their speeches in the indigenous communities of the region (eg. Rivera, 1980, in Ohland and Schneider, 1983) , was far more radical than that expressed in its written statements, published in Spanish for Sandinista consumption (eg. MISURASATA, 1979; Nuevo Diario, 15/10/1980, in Ohland and Schneider, 1983) . The organisation made much political capital out of the reluctance of the Sandinistas -who wanted to organise the Indians into state-owned cooperatives -to grant collective land rights to Indian communities, for whom titles to ancestral territory were a cultural necessity, rather than a simple matter of economics (eg. MISURASATA, 1980; Rivera, 1980, in Ohland and Schneider, 1983) . In the absence of any meaningful political role for SUKAWALA in the new, post-Revolutionary order, many Mayangna leaders felt compelled to support the 'universal' declarations of MISURASATA, which, while failing to address any specifically Mayangna demands, nevertheless contained no anti-Mayangna content and broadly appealed to a shared Costeño identity through its demands for land titles and its attacks on mestizo 'Spaniards' (Rivera, 1980, in Ohland and Schneider, 1983) .
The main body of MISURASATA's activists were Moravian pastors who had joined the organisation when it was still ALPOMISU and 'upon whom the… leadership were dependent for the activism needed to sustain the movement, and for the communication of their objectives' (Hawley, 1997: 14) . Many of these pastors also worked in, or supervised, Mayangna communities, where they became spokespersons for MISURASATA. As one interviewee explains: 'The clergy always spoke against the Revolution, said that it was 'Communism', and that it would make life very different… and worse' (interview with Dionisio Erants, 2011). Miskitu pastors warned that the 'communists' were planning take Mayangna land (interview with Carlos Sander, 2011; Americas Watch, 1987; Houwald, 2006; Dennis, 1981: 282) ; that Mayangna 'conscripts' were really being taken off and murdered (interview with Rolando Davis, 2011) ; that the Sandinistas wanted to burn their churches and kill all the Indians (interview with Juan Frank, 2011); or even that any Indian who stayed in Nicaragua would be made into soap (interview with Hazel Lau, 2011). As one former Mayangna contra observes: 'We, the Mayangna, are dependent on the Miskitu in religious matters. Whatever they said, it was as if it was written in the Bible' (interview with Serapio Palacios, 2011).
The Mayangna Leadership
An independent and political SUKAWALA could have countered this growing Spanish, but were fluent in Miskitu, and were subject to both the anti-Sandinista influence of the Miskitu-dominated 'Indian' organisation that they had been pressured by the Sandinistas into joining, and to that of the Miskitu-dominated 'Mayangna' church, gives some weight to the idea that they were 'deceived' into turning against the government. 
Sandinista Excesses
Ultimately, however, it was the Sandinista reaction to the growing pull of MISURASATA's 'Indianist' nationalism on the Mayangna that played the single most important role in provoking violent Mayangna opposition to the Revolution, as Sandinista violence against those suspected of 'disloyalty' led whole communities to flee to refugee camps in southern Honduras. These camps were run by the UN High Commission for Refugees but dominated by Fagoth's MISURA guerrillas, who were backed financially and logistically by the CIA and the Honduran Army (Hale, 1994: 265) . Fleeing to these camps for 'protection' thus left Mayangna refugees vulnerable to forced recruitment into MISURA (Americas Watch, 1987) .
After the first outbreak of Sandinista-Miskitu violence at Prinzapolka, in caused serious illness in children and older people. But as a minority population they could not make their complaints heard, especially at higher levels (Americas Watch, 1987: 11; Houwald, 2006: 599) .
In the face of these problems, the most important Mayangna guerrilla commander, Ampinio Palacios, decided to leave MISURA with his men and go over to the FDN, the main mestizo contra group, in late 1983. Steadman Fagoth reacted violently to the news and Ampinio was arrested with his brother Serapio, but both managed to escape (interviews with Ampinio Palacios, 2011; Serapio Palacios, 2011) . (Frank and Erants, 2000: 62) .
Sandinista Compromise
Even after the majority of Mayangna fighters deserted the Miskitu cause, the Mayangna in the camps felt it impossible to return to Nicaragua unarmed until the Sandinistas re-evaluated their nationalist revolutionary ideology (Dennis, 1993; Hale, 1994 proposed by Ronas Dolores Green amongst others, which specifically covered those 'Miskitu, Sumus, Ramas and Creoles detained for crimes against public order and security' and was translated into each of the languages of the coast and read out in the communities (Barricada, 30/04/1985) . This helped to restore Mayangna trust in the Sandinistas, and for the refugees and ex-combatants in Honduras, harassed there as they were by MISURA, made returning to Nicaragua seem a real possibility (interviews with Dionisio Erants, 2011; Econayo Taylor, 2011) .
The autonomy process and the amnesty also divided the Miskitu leadership of MISURA, which caused the organisation to splinter into pro-and anti-peace factions.
The declaration of a cease-fire by the former group undermined the authority in the While this has helped to bolster Mayangna pride in their own culture and language, the new emphasis on physical characteristics as key to Mayangna identity is also problematic, creating discord between different Mayangna groups, not all of whom fit comfortably within the racially defined schemata that Mayangna leaders seek to 26 construct in order to lay claim to regional prestige and influence. This has already resulted in the appearance of new divisions within a people for whom division has always proved disastrous.
The emphasis on Miskitu 'treachery' also risks blinding the Mayangna to the problems caused in both the past and present by their own leadership. Self-interest, corruption and a propensity toward caciquismo on the part of several key Mayangna leaders dragged entire communities -Musawás in particular -into the Civil War.
Even more importantly, it obscures Mayangna recognition of the problems caused them by the Nicaraguan state. Despite Sandinista promises and Mayangna hopes, the central government remains reluctant to deal effectively with issue of peasant landinvasions, and with the alliance of big landowners, local capitalists, and crooked lawyers and politicians that makes the appropriation and theft of Mayangna lands possible. This only confirms that, as any dispassionate reading of Mayangna history will show, it is the Nicaraguan state, rather than any one people or political party, that has posed the greatest threat to the Mayangna since the annexation of their territories to Nicaragua in 1860.
